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ABSTRACT 
Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of 
Government Redistribution 
by Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, Philipp Rehm 
To understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important 
to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional 
incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts 
to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the 
individual and national levels. In a first step, we focus on how risk exposure and 
income are related to preferences for redistribution. To test our hypotheses, we 
extract detailed risk exposure measures from labor force surveys and marry 
them to cross-national survey data. In a second step, we turn our attention to 
the supply side of government redistribution. Institutions, we argue, mediate 
governments’ reactions to redistributional demands following economic shocks. 
Using time-series cross-country data, we demonstrate how national training 
systems, electoral institutions as well as government partisanship shape 
government responses. 
 
Keywords: Public Opinion, Preferences, Redistribution, Varieties of Capitalism, 
Partisanship, Unemployment, Occupations 
JEL Classification: D31, D72, E24, H53
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Risiken und Arbeit: Die Nachfrage nach und das 
Angebot von staatlicher Umverteilung 
Um zu verstehen, wie Wohlfahrtsstaaten auf ökonomische Schocks reagieren, 
ist es wichtig, sowohl die Nachfrage- als auch die Angebotsseite von 
Umverteilung zu analysieren. Wie entstehen Umverteilungs-Präferenzen in der 
Bevölkerung? Welche institutionellen Anreize haben Regierungen, darauf zu 
reagieren? Das vorliegende Papier wendet einen generellen theoretischen 
Rahmen und umfangreiche Individual- und Aggregat-Daten an, um diesen 
Fragen nachzugehen. Dazu wird zuerst analysiert, wie Risiken im Arbeitsmarkt 
und das Einkommen Umverteilungs-Präferenzen von Individuen beeinflussen. 
Die abgeleiteten Hypothesen werden an neuen Datensätzen getestet. Diese 
kombinieren Informationen von Arbeitsmarkterhebungen und Umfrage-Daten 
für mehrere Länder und Jahre. In Sachen Angebotsseite wird argumentiert, 
dass unterschiedliche Regierungen auf ökonomische Schocks unterschiedlich 
reagieren, abhängig von Institutionen. Das Papier testet diese und andere 
Hypothesen auf der Aggregatsebene anhand von vergleichenden Zeitreihen. Es 
zeigt sich, dass die Art und Weise, wie Regierungen auf ökonomische Schocks 
reagieren, von Ausbildungs- und Wahlsystemen sowie der parteipolitischen 
Färbung der Regierung mitbestimmt werden. 
 
  
1. Introduction1 
 
Conventional wisdom has it that both the welfare state and the left’s effectiveness in 
implementing its preferred policies have eroded over the past several decades. These retreats 
putatively stem from globalization, technological change and other transforming forces. In part, 
these forces are assumed to be the sources of alteration in demand for the net benefits that flow 
from the welfare state and the policies championed by the left; in part they are assumed to reduce 
their supply. But while it is common to assume that class politics is on the decline and that social 
policies are converging across countries, very little is in fact known about the structure of 
political preferences and how economic shocks affect policies across different institutional 
settings.  
 
This paper provides a systematic account of the interaction between exogenous shocks, 
popular demand for compensation, and government responsiveness to such demand. Whereas the 
bulk of evidence in the existing literature is at the macro level and relies on cross-sectional 
evidence – or fixed effect regressions that ignore the role of political institutions – our paper uses 
a new data set that combine micro-level information about preferences and employment risks 
(across several decades) with macro-level data on institutions and government policies. Contrary 
to popular beliefs, our analysis shows that preferences for redistribution continue to be closely 
related to peoples’ position in the economy, and that governments respond very differently to 
economic shocks depending on the institutional and political context that they are embedded in. 
The paper makes three contributions.  
 
First, it provides a powerful defense of political economy explanations of redistributive 
politics. Recently, such explanations have been challenged by a number of papers which argue 
that religion, race, or ethnic diversity are the main sources of peoples’ preferences for social 
protection. We find little support for these arguments. Instead, what matters at the individual 
level is exposure to labor market risks, especially as reflected in actual or threatened 
unemployment. Job loss or the risk of job loss have important effects. The first is that it reduces 
income and adds to the ranks of those at the bottom end of the income distribution, who have a 
self-interest in redistribution. Secondly, it raises the demand for redistribution among employed 
workers since redistributive spending serves as an insurance against the risk of future income 
loss. The latter, in turn, depends on the portability of workers’ skills, and hence their ability to 
successfully navigate through the labor market as the tides of employment opportunities ebb and 
flow. We show that exposure to risk and relative income are remarkably strong predictors of 
redistributive preferences.   
 
The second contribution of this paper is to provide strong evidence for a tight linkage 
between redistributive preferences, partisan support, and government policies. Policies cannot be 
directly inferred from individual preferences. These depend on the two additional factors: first, 
the distribution of risks and how they are linked to salient political cleavages and, second, the 
impact of institutions on interest aggregation, particularly the manner in which institutions 
allocate influence to workers with different levels of risk exposure. Assuming that redistribution 
of income is the main axis of political competition and vote choice, the effects of government 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on “Democracy, 
Inequality, and Representation: Europe in Comparative Perspective”, Maxwell School of 
Syracuse University, May 2005. We are grateful for comments and suggestions made by the 
conference participants. 
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partisanship on responses to shocks will depend on the distribution of shocks across the income 
scale. Economic cleavages and government partisanship, it turns out, continue to matter a great 
deal for public policies. 
 
Third, we show the continued importance of national institutions in mediating 
government responses to shocks. Using a method devised by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), the 
analysis focuses on the role of national training systems and electoral systems. The training 
system shapes the composition of skills in the labor force, which in turn affects the level of 
demand for social insurance. Second, proportional representation (PR) tends to advantage the 
center-left, whereas majoritarian systems do the opposite. PR also facilitates the ability of 
political parties to make long-term social policy commitments. Our evidence clearly shows that 
these institutional differences, as well as government partisanship, affect how aggressively 
governments respond to economic shocks. There is no indication in our data of convergence in 
policies across political-institutional settings.   
 
The paper is organized into three sections. The first presents a simple organizing model 
with testable implications for both the structure of individual levels preferences and for the way 
these preferences are aggregated into actual policies. The succeeding section has two parts. In the 
first part, we use a new data set that combines public opinion and labor force survey data to test 
the individual-level hypotheses; in the second part, we explore how national institutions and 
partisanship condition the transmission of preferences into policy outcomes. The last section 
discusses the implication of our findings and points out possible extensions to this work. 
 
 
2. Preferences, shocks, and policies 
 
This section introduces the general structure of our political economy account of 
individual preferences and government policies. Section 2.1 highlights the importance of risks in 
labor markets for shaping redistributional preferences, which is contrasted to recent arguments 
emphasizing race and religion. Section 2.2 illuminates how the supply of redistribution is 
affected by institutions, especially national training systems, electoral systems, and the partisan 
governments that tend to accompany them. 
 
2.1. The demand for redistribution 
 
 In the standard Meltzer-Richard model, a flat-rate benefit R paid through a proportional 
tax means that those below the mean will prefer redistributive spending up to the point where the 
benefit to them is exactly outweighed by the efficiency cost of taxation (assuming a typical right-
skewed distribution of income). This implies that income is negatively related to support for 
redistribution. However, redistributive spending also serves insurance purposes by cushioning 
the effects of income losses, and this will affect the shape of the relationship between income 
and preferences. If those with higher incomes are also exposed to risks, they will demand some 
redistributive spending for insurance purposes.2  
 
                                                 
2 Indeed, if risk-aversion is sufficiently high it is possible for those with higher incomes 
to prefer more spending because they have more to lose (Moene and Wallerstein 2001). 
However, in the empirical section below we will show that the relationship between income and 
preference for redistribution is negative.  
2
  
We argue that there are two main sources of insecurity (or risk) in the labor market. One 
source is the risk of unemployment and the consequent loss of future income. Another source of 
insecurity is the potential devaluation of workers’ skills. This may arise if workers may have to 
accept re-employment into jobs where their skills are not fully utilized. 
 
Rising unemployment risks will induce individuals to demand higher protection against 
future income loss. One of the clearest signals of exposure to the loss of employment occurs 
when others with similar occupations become unemployed. As these numbers rise, so too will the 
individual’s insecurity. Therefore, individuals in occupations with high unemployment rates will 
demand greater insurance against these risks. One form this insurance takes is redistributive 
policies, manifested in income redistribution by the government. 
 
The more specific workers’ skills are to a job or firm, the less portable they are. 
Individuals with specific skills, therefore, are more sensitive to adverse conditions in labor 
markets: they may have to accept re-employment into jobs where their skills are not fully utilized 
and, therefore, suffer significant income loss. In order to insure against these risks, workers with 
specific skills will be more predisposed to support for redistributive policies (Estevez-Abe et al. 
2000; Iversen and Soskice 2001). 
 
The basic logic of the latter point is illustrated in Figure 1. Those in employment derive 
income from their general (g) and specific (s) skills. The former are assumed to be fully portable 
across firms, industries, and occupations, and there is an economy-wide market wage for these 
skills. In a perfectly competitive (neoclassical) labor market with only general skills, risks are 
minimal because the loss of one job is always matched by the availability of another at exactly 
the same wage (g). Specific skills, by contrast, are employable only in a particular firm, industry, 
or occupation, and losing a job therefore presents a serious risk if another job in the same firm, 
industry, or occupation is unavailable. Regardless of levels of unemployment – even in your own 
occupation – specificity of skills limits your re-employment potential. As a consequence, there is 
a potential loss of income which risk-averse individuals will try to insure against by demanding 
income protection through public policies. 
 
3
  
Figure 1: Transition between different labor market situations 
 
 
If the risk of unemployment is denoted p, the probability of re-employment q, and the 
probability of re-employment into a job using a worker’s combined specific and general skills 
r.q, the long-term probabilities of being in different labor market situations (unemployment and 
good or bad jobs) will be determined by the combination of these parameters, and so will 
expected income.3 If the government taxes income and spends it on a flat-rate benefit, R (as in 
the Meltzer-Richard model) workers’ level of demand for redistributive spending will depend on 
their location in the income distribution and their exposure to risk. 
 
Figure 2 shows the level of R that maximizes the current value of income from both 
wages and redistributive spending for workers with different income. Unless risk-aversion is 
very high, the relationship between income and preferences for redistribution is downward-
sloping. Our focus is on the effects of a shock to the economy exposes some workers to risks, 
and reduces the income of others because of loss of employment and income. While declining 
income will increase support for redistribution, greater exposure to risk will raise demand for 
insurance regardless of income. R captures both the redistributive and insurance aspects of 
spending. 
 
                                                 
3 Specifically, the long-term probability of unemployment is p/(p+q), the probability of 
employment in jobs utilizing both the specific and general skills of a worker is r.q/(p+q), and the 
probability of employment in jobs using only a worker’s general skills is (1-r)/(p+q).  
Employment using both
specific and general skills
(wage=s.g)
Employment using only
general skills
(wage=g)
EMPLOYMENT
1-rr
UNEMPLOYMENT
q p
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Figure 2: Support for redistribution as a function of income and risk 
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At the micro-level this paper now puts forward the following causal chain, reflecting a 
materialist political economy account. First, individual level preferences over redistribution are 
influenced by an individual’s income and the risk she faces in the labor market. Second, 
individuals objectively exposed to risk will (subjectively) perceive themselves as being exposed 
to risks. Third, preferences for or against redistribution will shape partisan preferences: all else 
equal, individuals in favor of redistribution support left parties, while individuals opposed to 
redistribution affiliate with right parties. In section 3, each of these claims will be tested 
empirically.4 
 
Our account of preferences for redistribution stands in contrast to some recent, and 
increasingly influential, explanations emphasizing non-economic factors. One of these argues for 
the importance of ethnicity and ethnic-racial heterogeneity (Alesina & Glaeser & Sacerdote 
2001; Alesina & Glaeser 2004). In this account, people are disinclined to redistribute to those of 
different ethnic or racial groups, and when minorities are overrepresented among the poor, as is 
typically the case, the level of redistribution declines. According to Alesina and Glaeser this is a 
main cause of lower redistribution in the United States compared to Western Europe. 
 
At the individual level, an implication of the argument is that those in the majority will 
prefer less redistributive spending. But if minorities are overrepresented among the poor, there is 
                                                 
4 Note that we focus exclusively on individuals in the labor market and the forces that 
affect them. Those not directly participating in this market may also vary in their preferences – 
an issue we address briefly in section 3. 
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of course a simple alternative, namely that the insurance motive for supporting redistribution is 
lower among those in the majority. Insurance motivated workers will rationally support less 
spending if their risk of income loss is lower. In the following, we control for whether ethnic 
minorities are in low paid jobs or risky occupations. While it is not straightforward to generalize 
the ethnicity argument beyond the US, we do not generally find that minorities are more likely to 
support redistributive spending than those in the majority who are in similar labor market 
situations. Minorities in the US, however, are notably more likely to support redistributive 
spending. 
 
Another explanation of individual redistributional preferences builds directly on the 
insurance logic of redistributional policies, but it argues that religion functions as a substitute for 
insurance (Scheve & Stasavage 2005). In this spiritual view, those who believe in God 
experience less psychic distress from unemployment and other adverse life events, and 
(assuming that income and psychic benefits are non-separable) this implies that they will demand 
less insurance. Scheve and Stasavage present empirical support for these propositions at the 
individual- as well as at the country-level. By contrast, we find relatively weak evidence for the 
spiritual argument once we control for risk exposure. 
 
A related argument is that the support for redistribution is undermined by the presence of 
cross-cutting cleavages such as religion or race. In Roemer’s (1997; 2001) model, people have 
intrinsic preferences on some ascriptive dimension such as race or religion, in addition to 
preferences over redistribution. When the former becomes politically salient, right parties can 
appeal to poor religious or racist voters, and the left party is forced to respond by attracting more 
wealthy anti-clerical or anti-racist voters. As this “exchange” of voters takes place, the two 
constituencies will tend to become more similar in terms of income. The original pro-welfare 
coalition is thus torn asunder by appeals to commonalities on another, non-economic, dimension. 
Since some have argued that the traditional economic left-right has declined in importance in 
electoral politics (Inglehart 1987, 1990; Kitschelt 1994), it is thus of considerable importance for 
the politics of redistribution to know the extent to which objective economic conditions, and 
preferences for redistribution, matter for people’s party choice. 
 
 
2.2. The supply of redistribution 
 
There is no Say’s Law in politics. But while demand and supply are unlikely to be in 
perfect accord, in democracies they should at least co-vary. The extent of covariation is likely to 
be shaped by institutions that mediate the translation of redistributional demand into 
redistributional supply. 
 
Following our micro argument, if there are differences in the composition of skills across 
countries, the demand for – and hence supply of – protection should vary in response to a given 
shock. Systems of production and training that emphasize specific skills should be associated 
with a stronger reaction by governments to shocks than from governments in systems that 
emphasize general skills. In particular it is plausible to assume that economies with extensive 
vocational training systems, as opposed to economies relying more on general education, tend to 
produce more people with highly specific skills. Insofar as such skills are associated with greater 
demand for insurance, systems with extensive vocational training should produce higher 
aggregate demand for redistribution. Correspondingly, the rise in demand for such redistribution 
in response to adverse economic shocks should be greater in specific skills’ systems where they 
may expose workers to a longer spell of unemployment or a permanent drop in income. 
6
  
 
But the effects of demand on supply also depend on the distribution of risk, how closely 
tied it is with the main cleavage of party competition, and how political institutions shape the 
aggregation of preferences. Specifically, if the main axis of political competition is over 
redistribution of income, the effect of shocks on policies will depend on the distribution of risks 
across income, as well as on the segment of the income distribution the government represents. 
We have assumed above, and will show empirically below, that risk exposure is decreasing in 
income (i.e., the effect of a shock is greater at lower income levels). Whether this is true is an 
empirical question, but if income and risk are related, then government responses to shocks 
should depend on partisanship. Left governments representing lower-income workers should 
respond with greater increases in transfers than right governments. 5 
 
The partisan logic also suggests a role for electoral institutions because PR has been 
associated with more left-leaning governments, and majoritarian institutions with more right-
leaning governments (Crepaz 1998; Powell 2002; Iversen & Soskice 2004). Because left parties 
tend to represent voters who are at greater risk, the preferences of these voters will be better 
represented in coalition bargaining. PR may also increase the sensitivity of governments to 
popular demands for protection because political parties are better able to make long-term 
commitments when they do not have to concern themselves exclusively with winning the next 
election (as under majoritarian institutions). Capacity for commitment matters because those who 
are currently affected by shocks (say, the unemployed) are rarely the “decisive” voters in 
electoral politics. If these are instead employed middle class voters (roughly synonymous with 
the “median voter” in a unidimensional space), the only motive these voters have for supporting 
more spending is insurance, not redistribution. Yet, if parties can only credibly commit 
government policies for one electoral term, the only effect of spending is redistribution. Having 
programmatic and responsible parties capable of making commitments beyond the next election -
- which is a quality often associated with multiparty PR systems -- is therefore an important 
determinant of government responsiveness to economic shocks.  
 
Summarizing, we would expect left partisanship and PR to amplify policy responses to 
exogenous shocks provided that i) political competition is organized around income 
redistribution, ii) exposure to risks is declining in income, and iii) individual preferences for 
redistribution are determined by income and exposure to risk. The latter should depend on the 
composition of workers’ skills, which also implies that the structure of national training systems 
will matter for how responsive policies are to exogenous shocks. 
 
 
3. Evidence 
 
Following the theoretical discussion, the empirical analysis in this paper has two parts. 
The first focuses on the demand side and examines the relationship between our political 
economy variables (risk exposure and income) and redistributional preferences as well as the 
joint distribution of income and exposure to risks. We also examine the relationship between 
objective and subjective measures of risk, as well as the linkage between redistributive and 
partisan preferences. The second part focuses on the supply side and tests whether shocks lead to 
                                                 
5 In the end, of course, whether risk-exposure and income are related is an empirical 
matter that we explicitly test below. 
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different government responses depending on national training systems, partisanship, and 
electoral institutions.  
 
 
3.1. Micro-level evidence 
 
3.1.1. Statistical model and data 
 
In order to examine the relationship between exposure to risks and preferences for 
redistribution, we specify and estimate a model of redistribution preferences based on objective 
measures of risk exposure plus a set of controls. The following ordered logit model is estimated 
using country and year dummies: 
 
1 2 3
, , , , , ,
j j
i t i t i t i t i t i tRD S U I Xα β β β γ ε= + + + + +∑ ,  (1) 
 
where RD are individual-level preferences or demand for redistribution, S is skill specificity, U 
are exposure to unemployment risks as measured by occupational unemployment rates (we also 
include a control variable for those who or unemployed), and I is income – i indexes individuals 
and t time period. The regressions include a vector of controls, X, including religiosity and 
minority status.6 
 
We rely on a new data set that combines public opinion and labor force survey data from 
a variety of national and international sources. The public opinion data are from several waves of 
the “International Social Survey Programme” (ISSP),7 which ask people directly about their 
preferences for redistribution. Specifically, a large number of the ISSP surveys contain two 
similar questions about redistribution. One reads: 
 
“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.”  
 
The possible answer categories range from 1 (“agree strongly”) to 5 (“disagree strongly”).8 This 
question was asked in eight ISSP studies between 1985 and 2000.9 The other reads: 
 
“On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility 
to: Reduce income differences between the rich and poor?”  
 
The possible answer categories range from 1 (“definitely should be”) to 4 (“probably should 
be”).10 This question was included in five ISSP waves from 1985 to 1998. 
                                                 
6 All variables included in the equation are described below and defined in the appendix. 
7 See http://www.issp.org/data.htm for details on the original data. 
8 The complete answer categories are: 1 “agree strongly” 2 “agree” 3 “neither agree nor 
disagree” 4 “disagree” 5 “disagree strongly” 8 “Can't choose” 9 “NA”; we changed the latter two 
categories to missing values. For presentational purposes, we reversed the scale. 
9 For details on the country-years included in the estimations, see Tables A3 and A4 in 
the appendix. 
10 The complete answer categories are: 1 “definitely should be” 2 “probably should be” 3 
“probably should not be” 4 “definitely should not be” 8 “Can't choose” 9 “NA”; we changed the 
latter two categories to missing values. For presentational purposes, we reversed the scale. 
8
  
 
The key political economy variables are measures of risks and income. For the former, 
we use three indicators: skill specificity, exposure to unemployment risk, and what we may call 
realized risk, namely whether or not the individual is currently unemployed. Skill specificity and 
exposure to unemployment risk both rely on occupational data based on the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (1988)” (ISCO88). As in Iversen and Soskice (2001), we 
calculated the skill specificity of an individual’s occupation by dividing a) the share of 
occupational groups in the broadest ISCO occupational class to which that occupation belongs 
by b) the share the labor force in that class. To get a measure of specificity that is relative to an 
individual’s general skills (s1), or to his or her total skills (s2), it is then weighted by either an 
individual’s reported level of education11 or by ILO’s measure of occupational skill level.12 The 
measure used in this paper is Iversen and Soskice’s composite indicator, which is the average of 
s1 and s2. Skill specificity is high if an individual is in a very specialized occupation, but has 
relatively low levels of education or skills. It is low if the occupation is not very specialized, 
while the level of education or skills is high.  
 
Second, as in Rehm (2005), we extracted information from labor force surveys that allow 
for the calculation of occupational unemployment rates.13 Such a rate is analogous to national 
unemployment rates, but is specific to an occupational category. The rate is calculated in the 
following way: the number of unemployed in an ISCO category is taken as a percentage of the 
sum of the employed and unemployed in that ISCO category. If possible, this is done for women 
and men separately. In the optimal case, this results in a measure that distinguishes among 52 
occupational unemployment rates per country-year (26 occupations – at the ISCO88 2-digit level 
– times 2 genders). 
 
Making the two measures consistent over time and across countries presented some 
challenges. Different country investigative teams employ different occupational classifications, 
and some teams have changed the classes they use over time.14 The ISSP principal investigators 
for Italy and Japan altogether resisted the temptation to make their occupational variables 
internationally comparable. These countries, therefore, had to be dropped from the analyses. But 
for other countries we were able to piece together a data set that translates the different 
occupational classifications into ISCO88. This translation data-set draws on existing 
concordance tables15 as well as tables that we constructed ourselves with the help of national 
statistical offices. These were also used to standardize the labor force data, allowing the 
occupational unemployment data to be merged with the ISSP survey data. 
 
                                                 
11 See appendix for details on the educational variable. 
12 The skill levels are assigned by the ILO. A mapping of ISCO88 1-digit codes and skill 
levels can be found at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/research/isco88/english/s2. We 
assign “Legislators, senior officials and managers” (ISCO88 major group 1) the highest skill 
level, while the ILO does not assign any skill level for that group. 
13 The occupational unemployment risk variable we employ below combines the most 
detailed data we have for each country. This ranges from ISCO88-2d by gender to ISCO88-1d by 
gender. See appendix for details. 
14 By way of example, the principal investigators of Italy as well as Japan resisted the 
temptation to make their occupational variables internationally comparable. These countries, 
therefore, had to be dropped from the analyses. 
15 Concordance tables are sometimes also known as crosswalks. 
9
  
Finally, we include income to capture the Meltzer-Richard logic, in which those with 
incomes above the mean will oppose governmental redistribution, while others will support it. In 
addition to these political economy variables we control for the following characteristics:16 
 
Religiosity: 
As in Schheve and Stasavage (2005) we control for both church attendance, and religious 
denomination (Protestant or Catholic). 
 
Minority status: 
For the U.S., this variable codes Blacks, Hispanics, Chinese, Japanese, and Indian as minorities 
(1, zero otherwise). Note that for many other countries there is no information available on a 
respondent’s minority status. For those few countries where this information is available, we 
coded those respondents who can reasonably be classified as disadvantaged minorities. See 
appendix for details. 
 
Age: 
Should they lose their current jobs older workers are disadvantaged in seeking re-employment. 
This puts them at greater risk than younger workers, and we should correspondingly expect 
higher predisposition for redistribution. 
 
Gender: 
Because women tend to be the primary caregivers, they are in a disadvantaged position within 
the labor market compared to men. This is particularly true in the event of divorce where 
transfers from the state are often the only means of income. Correspondingly, we should expect 
women to be more supportive of redistribution by the government. 
 
Students: 
Students are often the direct as well as indirect beneficiaries of governmental redistribution. As 
such it is in their interest to embrace such policies. On the other hand, their preferences might be 
determined in part by expected future earnings.   
 
Retired: 
In the main the retired are beneficiaries of government redistributional policies. It seems only 
natural, then, to anticipate that these individuals will favor income redistribution. 
 
Self-Employed: 
The self-employed depend on flexible labor markets and frequently rely on hiring relatively low-
paid labor. They would stand to lose from most governmental redistributional efforts. As a 
consequence, we would expect these individuals to oppose most redistributive policies.  
 
Non-employed: 
This is a residual category intended to pick up any effects of not being in the labor market that 
are not captured by the student, retired, and unemployed variables. Since the group is 
heterogeneous there are no clear expectations regarding the effect of this variable on 
redistributive preferences.  
 
                                                 
16 Because it is used for the operationalization of skill specificity, we do not control for 
education. 
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Publicly employed:17 
There are multiple arguments about why the publicly employed would favor governmental 
redistributional policies. For example, Blais, Blake and Dion (1990) report public opinion studies 
showing a general tendency for public employees to be more supportive of larger governments 
than are private sector employees. As argued by Knutsen (2005: 593-594), public sector 
employment “can be a significant political cleavage.” For example, “the public employee has 
clear self-interests connected to large public budgets [and] a well-developed welfare state.” 
Hence, the publicly employed would be in favor of redistribution by the government. 
 
Union membership: 
Union members, particularly where joining a union is a matter of choice, are likely to be in a 
union precisely because they are concerned with the security of their jobs and income. Such 
worries should prompt support for redistribution. 
 
 
3.1.2. Findings for redistributional preferences 
 
Table 1 displays the results of four ordered logit regressions on the dependent variable 
with five answer categories. Table A6 in the appendix is the analogous table employing the 
dependent variable with the four answer categories. Model (1) embodies the argument of the 
theoretical section of this paper. Note that model (4) expands the list of control variables, but 
because of missing data for some country-years, we loose about 15 to 20 % of the observations 
included in model (1). 18 Model (2) adds to our basic specification variables which capture the 
Scheve-Stasavage religious explanation of redistributional preferences. We note that Scheve & 
Stasavage employ a different dependent variable in their paper. Table A7 in the appendix reports 
the results on these alternative measures of redistributive spending preferences. Model (3) again 
uses our basic formulation and introduces a dummy variable capturing a respondent’s minority 
status. This specification is intended to assess the Alesina & Glaeser (2004) argument regarding 
preferences for redistribution. The reader should note that the ISSP data-sets have rather sparse 
information on respondents’ ethnic backgrounds. As a consequence, we loose about 60% of the 
observations compared to model (1) and these observations are rather restrictive in terms of 
cross-national coverage.  
                                                 
17 Because of many missing values, we will perform the regression analyses both 
including and excluding the control variables public employment and union membership.  
18 See Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix for details. 
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Table 1: Determinants of Preferences for Redistribution 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pro Redistribution (5 answer categories) 
   Occupational unemployment rate a 0.020*** [0.003] 
0.021*** 
[0.004] 
0.026*** 
[0.006] 
0.019*** 
[0.004] 
   Skill specificity b 0.130*** [0.018] 
0.134*** 
[0.019] 
0.082*** 
[0.028] 
0.141*** 
[0.020] 
   Unemployed 0.568*** [0.055] 
0.577*** 
[0.058] 
0.522*** 
[0.085] 
0.670*** 
[0.062] 
   Income c -0.144*** [0.004] 
-0.147*** 
[0.004] 
-0.160*** 
[0.007] 
-0.144*** 
[0.005] 
   Age 0.001 [0.001] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
0.002* 
[0.001] 
   Gender (female) 0.167*** [0.020] 
0.176*** 
[0.021] 
0.124*** 
[0.032] 
0.162*** 
[0.022] 
   Non-employed 0.288*** [0.042] 
0.299*** 
[0.044] 
0.205*** 
[0.063] 
0.422*** 
[0.050] 
   Student 0.251*** [0.056] 
0.249*** 
[0.059] 
0.260*** 
[0.088] 
0.401*** 
[0.063] 
   Retired 0.276*** [0.048] 
0.285*** 
[0.050] 
0.228*** 
[0.075] 
0.389*** 
[0.055] 
   Self-employed -0.342*** [0.034] 
-0.359*** 
[0.036] 
-0.383*** 
[0.055] 
-0.206*** 
[0.038] 
   Church attendance d - -0.021*** [0.008] - - 
   Protestant - -0.135*** [0.028] - - 
   Catholic - 0.092*** [0.033] - - 
   Minority - - 0.594*** [0.077] - 
   Publicly employed - - - 0.156*** [0.029] 
   Union membership - - - 0.279*** [0.029] 
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 48334 44576 19343 41712 
Pseudo 2R  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -68252.9 -62882.7 -28589.7 -58339 
Wald 2χ  (degrees of freedom) 7368.33 (36) 6997.58 (39) 2589.62 (23) 5452.19 (36) 
Notes: 
Ordered logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights). 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See appendix for details on variable descriptions. 
a Right censored at 20% (ca. 95th percentile), at the most detailed occupational level. Zeros for people not in labor force. 
b Right censored at 3.33 (ca. 95th percentile). Zeros for people not in labor force. 
c In 9 (national) quantiles. 
d Church attendance [0 (no (Christian) religion, 1 (never), …, 5 (once a week)]. Results do not change if zeros (0) are changed to 
missing values. 
Results for models (2) & (3) including the control variables ‘publicly employed’ and ‘union membership’ are basically the same. 
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There are no indications from the summary statistics that the models should be rejected. 
Our general expectations with respect to control variables are borne out. The only exception to 
this is age, where in three of four instances the variable’s coefficient is not statistically 
significant. We should note that with respect to the non-employed variable, for which we had no 
a priori expectation, the coefficient is consistently positive and statistically significant. 
 
Our primary emphasis in this section has been on the political economy variables (risk 
exposure, realized risk, and income) and their impact on redistributional preferences. This is 
captured in model (1) of Table 1. There one can see that all of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and take on the predicted signs. The greater the risk an individual 
experiences in the labor market, and the lower his or her income, the more supportive of 
government redistribution that individual is. 
 
But how important are these variables in substantive terms? In terms of model (1) we rely 
on simulations to answer this question (see Figures 3-8).19 These simulations reveal how the 
probability of falling into a certain answer category changes, depending on values of an 
independent variable, holding everything else constant. For example, this is how the numbers for 
Figure 3 were computed. We first calculate the probability that an employed person would give 
one of the five possible answers to the redistribution preference question. In this and all other 
simulations, the values of the variables not being simulated are held constant. Across the possible 
answers, the probabilities must sum to one. Second, the associated probabilities for each of the 
five categories are calculated for an unemployed person. Of course, these probabilities have to 
sum up to one as well. Third we compute the differences between the probabilities for each 
category, comparing an employed with an unemployed respondent. These differences are 
displayed in the figure. For example, Figure 3 shows that the probability of ‘strongly 
disagreeing’ with redistribution by the government for an unemployed individual is around .01 
lower than the corresponding chance for an employed individual.20 Likewise, the probabilities of 
an unemployed respondent ‘disagreeing’, ‘neither agreeing nor disagreeing’ as well as ‘agreeing’ 
with redistribution are each lower by about 0.04 compared to an employed person. 
Simultaneously, the probability of ‘strongly agreeing’ is 0.13 higher for an unemployed person 
relative to an employed person. The changes in probabilities must sum to 0 (ignoring rounding 
errors, as in Figure 3), but they do not have to be evenly distributed over the answer categories. 
In Figure 3, for example, the probability of an unemployed respondent to ‘agree’ with 
redistribution actually decreases! This is so because many respondents shift from that category to 
the ‘strongly agree’ one. 
                                                 
19 All simulations are performed with SPost, a very helpful STATA ado-file written by 
Scott Long (http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/spost.htm). See also Long and Freese (2001). 
20 The paper’s figures display probabilities (or changes therein) on the y-axis. 
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Figure 3: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function job loss 
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Note: Differences in redistributive preferences comparing an employed with an unemployed individual. 
Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. 
 
Figure 4: Changes in redistributive preferences as a 
function of differences in skill specificity 
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Note: Change in skill specificity from 0 (min) to 3.33 (95th percentile) and p20 to p80. 
Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. 
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The contrast between being employed and unemployed, the latter being a “realized” risk, 
is a good benchmark for assessing the effects of exposure to risks – our central independent 
variables. Figure 4 presents the simulation results connected to skill specificity, one of our 
postulated risk factors, and preferences regarding redistribution. Using a 95 percentile range, the 
difference between having general and having very specific skills is comparable in its magnitude 
on redistributional preferences to the difference between being employed and being unemployed 
(shown in Figure 3).21 
 
Likewise, simply being highly exposed to the risk of unemployment has an impact nearly 
as great as actually being unemployed (Figure 5). While being unemployed increases the 
probability of strongly agreeing with government redistribution by .13, a high risk of 
unemployment elevates this probability at a slightly lower rate, i.e., .09. Similarly, individuals 
with high skill specificity have a .09 higher chance of strongly supporting government 
redistribution than do individuals with general skills. 
 
Figure 5: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function of an 
increase in occupational unemployment rates 
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Note: Change in risk from 0 (min) to 20 (95th percentile) and p20 to p80. 
Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. 
 
When taken together, these two elements of risk exposure in the labor markets appear to 
have a powerful impact on individuals’ preferences for redistribution. Figure 6 plots the 
combined simulated effects of moving from a situation in which an individual is not exposed to 
risk on both the skill specificity and the unemployment dimensions to a situation of maximal 
                                                 
21 Simulations involving continuous independent variables of interest not only display 
changes from the variable’s minimum to maximum value (or 95th percentile) but also from its 
20th to its 80th percentile. 
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exposure to risk. The effect is to sharply increase the likelihood (viz., .20) that an individual will 
strongly agree with government redistribution.  
 
Figure 6: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function of an 
increase in occupational unemployment rate as well as in skill specificity 
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Note: Change in occupational unemployment risk from 0 to 20 (95th percentile) and change in  
skill specificity from 0 to 3.33 (95th percentile). Also, changes from p20 to p80. 
Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. 
 
Finally, Figure 7 contrasts the differences in preferences for redistribution between those 
well below the mean income and those well above it. According to the Meltzer-Richard 
argument, the former are far more supportive of egalitarian redistribution by the government than 
the latter. This is indeed the case when one examines the results produced in Table 1. 
Substantively, one can observe marked differences in redistributional preferences between 
individuals with very low and very high incomes. 
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Figure 7: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function 
of moving from the bottom to the top income quantile 
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Note: Change in income from quantile 1 (min) to quantile 9 (max) and p20 to p80. 
Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. 
 
Our results indicate that preferences for redistribution are very much in line with what we 
would expect from peoples’ “objective” economic positions. Poor people as well as individuals 
exposed to high risks favor governmental redistribution, while the rich and those in secure labor 
market positions tend to be less supportive of such policies. Figure 8 shows that, together, 
income and risk exposure leave a strong imprint on redistributional preferences. Simulations 
with combinations of the extremes on these variables reveal that individuals have markedly 
different preference profiles, depending on their exposure to risk and their earnings. As a group, 
individuals with both high income and low risk are relatively ambivalent in their redistributive 
preferences. The likelihood that such an individual would support redistribution is .53, while the 
corresponding chance that she or he would oppose it is .28. Rounding this out, there is a .19 
chance that such an individual would express indifference on this issue. Alternatively, those 
misfortunate enough to be both at high risk in the labor market and poor in terms of income 
would have an overwhelming chance of favoring redistribution (the likelihood being .89), with 
only a .05 chance of opposing redistribution and a .06 chance of expressing indifference. It is 
hard to imagine clearer evidence that economic interests are critical in explaining redistributive 
policy preferences. Though some people may be “rationally ignorant” about their interests, most 
are not. 
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Figure 8: Redistributive preferences as a function of different 
combinations of income and risk exposure 
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Note: Combinations of changes in income from quantile 1 to quantile 9 and in risk exposure (occupational un-
employment rates and skill specificity combined) from lowest to highest. Simulations based on model (1) in Table 1. 
 
 
 This conclusion is strengthened when we compare the results to those for religion (Table 
1, model (2) as well as Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix). Focusing on church attendance, the 
variable of interest for Scheve & Stasavage, we find that its impact is statistically significant in 
some models. Nevertheless, the substantive impact of church attendance is barely discernible. In 
Figure 9, we present simulation results comparing those with no church attendance to those who 
go regularly and frequently to church. There is practically no difference in terms of 
redistributional preferences between these two types of people.22 
                                                 
22 Figure A3 in the appendix shows simulation results on church attendance, excluding 
our risk exposure variables. The statistical significance as well as the substantive effect of the 
religious variables are somewhat larger without the risk exposure variables. This indicates 
religious people are somewhat less likely to be in risky labor market positions. 
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Figure 9: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function 
of church attendance (controlling for risk exposure) 
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Note: Change in church attendance from min (0) to max (5) and p20 to p80. Simulations based on model (2) in Table 1. 
 
 
The evidence for an effect of minority status is ambiguous (see Table 1, model (4)). 
Although there is a substantively important positive effect of minority status on preferences for 
redistribution, this seems to be due to minorities within the US (mainly American Blacks and 
Hispanics) favoring redistribution. Outside the US, our data do not allow for careful testing of 
the ethnicity argument,23 but for the countries for which we have data (Canada, UK, Germany, 
Sweden) minority status does not seem to shape redistributional preferences. The ethnicity 
argument is interesting, but clearly needs to be evaluated with better data. 
 
 
3.1.3. The relationship between objective and subjective measures of risk 
 
The conclusion that individuals form their redistributive preferences based on their 
objective position in the economy can be strengthened by exploring the linkage between 
objective and subjective measures of job security. While it is unsurprising that preferences over 
redistribution are related to people’s expressed insecurity, it is not obvious that people have a 
good idea about their actual exposure to risk. If not, the politics of redistribution may still in 
large measure be a politics of values. It turns out, however, that subjective insecurity is closely 
related to objective insecurity when we regress a measure of the former on the objective risk 
                                                 
23 Another problem with the data arises as a consequence of the huge drop in the number 
of respondents. Our two risk exposure variables are highly correlated with each other in the small 
sample and the results seem to suffer from multi-collinearity (see model (3) Table A6). When we 
add the risk exposure variables separately into the equation, they turn out to be highly 
significant, both substantively and statistically. 
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measures employed in this paper. The dependent variable ‘perceived insecurity’ is based on the 
following ISSP survey question:24 
 
“[…] show how much you agree or disagree that [the statement] applies to your [main] 
job. My job is secure.” 
 
Table 2: Determinants of perceived job insecurity (employed only) 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Perceived Insecurity (ordered logit, 5 categories) 
Perceived Insecurity 
(logit) 
Occupational unemployment rate a 0.035*** [0.008] 
0.030** 
[0.010] 
Skill specificity b 0.123*** [0.035] 
0.100** 
[0.048] 
Income c -0.087*** [0.011] 
-0.096*** 
[0.016] 
Age -0.007*** [0.002] 
-0.004 
[0.003] 
Gender (female) -0.035 [0.047] 
-0.031 
[0.070] 
Self-employed 0.054 [0.080] 
0.115 
[0.106] 
Country Dummies yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes 
Constant - -1.306*** [0.313] 
Observations 7783 7783 
Pseudo 2R  0.03 0.04 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -10777.07 -3518.81 
Wald 2χ  (degrees of freedom) 463.48 (17) 246.51 (17) 
Notes: 
(Ordered) logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights). 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See appendix for details on variable descriptions. 
a Right censored at 20% (ca. 95th percentile), at the most detailed occupational level. Employed only. 
b Right censored at 3.33 (ca. 95th percentile). Employed only. 
c In 9 (national) quantiles. 
Based on ISSP surveys from 1989 (USA, Ireland) and 1997 (USA, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West Germany, East 
Germany, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand). 
 
The possible answer categories range from 1 (“agree strongly”) to 5 (“disagree 
strongly”). High values on this categorical dependent variable indicate high perceived job 
insecurity and we should observe a positive correlation between the objective risk exposure 
measures and this measure. Table 2 shows that this is exactly the case.25 When regressing the 
subjective risk exposure measure on the objective risk exposure measures, plus a set of controls, 
                                                 
24 There is no single ISSP survey that includes both the perceived insecurity question and 
on or the other of our redistributional preferences variables. The perceived insecurity question 
was posed in the 1989 and the 1997 surveys. 
25 Note that the sample in Table 2 is restricted to employed people only. The dependent 
variable – perceived job insecurity – hardly makes sense for people outside the labor market. 
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one finds that occupational unemployment rates as well as skill specificity are statistically 
significant predictors of perceived job insecurity.  
 
 The objective risk exposure measures employed in this paper are not only statistically, 
but also substantively important predictors of perceived job insecurity. Figure 10 displays the 
differences in predicted probabilities for “disagreeing” or “strongly disagreeing” with the 
statement that ones job is secure. Changing an individual’s occupational unemployment rate 
from its minimum to its maximum value increases this individual’s probability of subjectively 
feeling insecure by 0.09. Skill specificity exerts less, but still a substantially important, influence 
on subjective risk exposure. In terms of substantial impact, income importantly decreases 
individual’s perceived risk exposure. 
 
Figure 10: Changes in perceived job insecurity as a function of changes 
in occupational unemployment rates, skill specificity, income 
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Note: Differences in perceived job insecurity. The figure shows the differences in predicted probabilities of 
“disagreeing” or “strongly disagreeing” with the statement “my job is secure.” Simulated are changes in three 
independent variables with minimum / maximum (p20 / p80) values. 
Simulations based on model (2) in Table 2. 
 
The relationship between the objective risk exposure measures and perceived job 
insecurity can also be seen in Figure 11. The figure shows the mean value of both objective risk 
exposure measures – skill specificity and occupational unemployment rates – for each answer 
category on the ‘my-job-is-secure’ question. Clearly, individuals objectively exposed to more 
risks in the labor market subjectively feel their jobs to be more insecure. 
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Figure 11: Relationship between insecurity and risk exposure 
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Note: Shown are mean values of the risk exposure variables for each answer category  
to the statement “my job is secure” 
 
 
3.1.4. The relationship between redistributional and partisan preferences 
 
There is one final micro-level causal link in our story: redistributional preferences should 
strongly influence individuals’ partisan preferences. Table 3 shows that they do. In the first two 
models of Table 3, the dependent variable is individuals’ partisan affiliation on a variable 
ranging from 1 (“far right”) to 5 (“far left”). We placed each party in our sample in one of these 
categories.26 Models (3) and (4) of Table 3 repeat the analyses for a binary dependent variable. 
There, “far left” and “left” parties are coded as a one (1), and the remaining parties as a zero (0). 
                                                 
26 We added the category “other” for parties that are particularly difficult to place. These 
are not included in the analyses. For details on the classification choices, see appendix. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Partisan Preferences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Right-Left Partisan Affiliation (ordered logit, 5 categories) 
Left Partisan Affiliation 
(logit) 
Pro Redistribution (five categories) 0.423*** [0.007] - 
0.440*** 
[0.008] - 
Pro Redistribution (four categories) - 0.585*** [0.010] - 
0.574*** 
[0.012] 
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant   -1.527*** [0.135] 
-2.620*** 
[0.171] 
Observations 73522 45498 73522 45498 
Pseudo 2R  0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -87460.42 -54287.02 -46831.01 -29050.95 
Wald 2χ  (degrees of freedom) 7023.25 (32) 4658.47 (25) 5254.88 (32) 3300.55 (25) 
Notes: 
(Ordered) logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights). 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See appendix for details on variable descriptions. 
Based on ISSP data for USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West 
Germany, East Germany, Austria, Finland (not models (2) and (4)), Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand. 
 
 
 The results show that redistributional preferences are excellent predictors of partisan 
affiliation, and the magnitudes of the predicted probabilities, i.e. the variables’ substantive 
effects – are very impressive. Figure 12 displays the predicted probabilities of revealing a right 
(i.e. far right, right or center) or left (i.e. far left and left) partisan affiliation, contingent on the 
individual’s revealed preference for income redistribution. The left panel in the figure shows the 
likelihoods that the individual affiliates with the right and left, respectively, in the case where 
that individual reveals a preference strongly opposing redistribution (i.e., 1 on the 5-category 
scale). This individual’s probability of affiliating with the right is 0.76, while the probability of 
affiliating with the left is only 0.24. Conversely, as shown on the right panel in the figure, 
individuals with revealed preferences strongly in favor of redistribution (i.e., 5 on the 5-category 
scale) over-proportionally affiliate with the left. These individuals have a .65 chance of 
preferring a left party and only a .35 chance of expressing a preference for a centrist or rightist 
party. Individuals who are indifferent regarding income redistribution (i.e., 3 on the 5-category 
scale) are also relatively ambivalent in their expressions of partisan preferences (see middle 
panel). 
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Figure 12: Predicted probabilities for partisan affiliation  
as a function of redistributional preferences 
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Note: Change in predicted probabilities for affiliating with left / very left or center / right / very right parties as a 
function of redistributional preferences from opposition (left panel) through indifference (middle panel) to support 
(right panel). Simulations based on model (3) in Table 3. 
 
 
But the salience of these preferences for partisan politics depends on their association 
with electoral cleavages. Many political economists follow the lead of Downs, Hibbs and 
Meltzer and Richard in assuming that income redistribution is the principal dimension of partisan 
competition. Our results on redistributional preferences and partisan affiliation at the individual 
level support this claim. But preferences for redistribution are themselves a function of income 
and risk exposure. If the poor are also exposed to high labor market risks, one would expect that 
shocks to the labor market would produce different responses by governments dominated by left 
or by right parties. Risk exposure, in this scenario, reinforces the demand for redistribution due 
to income differences. But whether risk exposure and income are reinforcing or cross-cutting 
cleavages is, of course, an empirical question.  
 
One way to answer this question is simply to correlate income and risk exposure at the 
individual level within the data-set. The Pearson correlation coefficient between income and skill 
specificity at this levels is -0.1574 (N= 105,577), the one between income and occupational 
category unemployment rates is -0.2314 (N= 76,875). Because of the large sample sizes both 
correlations are highly statistically significant, but they may appear quite low. In fact, when 
using individual level data-sets correlations at this magnitude between conceptually distinct 
variables are quite rare (Gelissen 2002: 159-160). They indicate very strong systematic 
relationships, which become clearer when we look at the relationship between income and risk 
exposure for different income groups. 
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Figure 13 depicts the relationship between income and the risk exposure measures for 
each income group. At this level of aggregation, it becomes quite apparent that our risk measures 
are highly correlated with income. The correlation coefficient between income and skill 
specificity (occupational unemployment rates) is -0.9797 (-0.9252). This strongly suggests that 
risks in the labor market and income are reinforcing and not cross-cutting cleavages. In light of 
these findings, we should expect marked partisan differences in government reactions to labor 
market shocks. Showing this is the remaining task, which is addressed in the next section. 
 
Figure 13: Relationship between income and risk exposure 
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3.2. Macro-level evidence 
 
3.2.1. Statistical model and data 
 
The estimation strategy at the macro-level follows the approach in Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000). There, political-institutional variables are included in the regression as 
interactions with the shocks that are supposed to condition the shocks’ effects.27 Blanchard and 
Wolfers propose two versions of the model, and we estimate both.  
 
The first assumes that countries are exposed to uniform, and unobservable, exogenous 
shocks. Since the nature of the shocks is left unspecified in this version, the purpose is simply to 
determine whether countries with different institutions respond differently to them. The shocks 
are proxied by a set of year dummies (Dt) that are interacted with the j political-institutional 
variables (I): 
                                                 
27 The dependent variable in Blanchard and Wolfers’ analysis is unemployment. 
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i,t , ,RS (1 ) ,
j j k k
i t i i t i tD I Xα β γ ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑   (2) 
 
where RS refers to government transfers (or “redistributional supply”), and i indexes countries, t 
time, and k a set of control variables. The common unobserved shocks in this formulation are 
captured by the time dummies, and the political-institutional effects by the parameters β j. If β is 
zero it means that the effects of the shocks are identical across political-institutional 
configurations. If it is positive (negative) it means that the relevant institutional feature magnifies 
(reduces) the effect of the common shocks. The model uses country-specific intercepts so that 
differences observed between countries can be attributed entirely to policy changes.  
 
The second formulation identifies the nature of the shock, and allows it to vary across 
countries. The shock variable, Si,t, is simply substituted in for the time dummies in the first 
model: 
 
i,t , , ,RS (1 ) ,
j j k k
i i t i i t i tS I Xα β γ ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑   (3) 
 
The data for the estimations of the two models are from sixteen OECD countries over a 
36-year period from 1960 to 1995.28 This period covers both the Golden Age of welfare state 
expansion as well as what Pierson has called the “new politics” of retrenchment (Pierson 1996). 
The following describes the variables we used: 
 
Government transfers: 
The dependent spending variable is proxied by total government transfers to private households 
as a share of GDP. The data are described in Cusack (1991) and are drawn mainly from OECD, 
National Accounts, Part II: Detailed Tables (various years).  
 
Shock variables: 
Following the micro-level analysis we employ two different shock variables (in addition to the 
time dummies). One is unemployment as a percentage of the labor force and the other is 
deindustrialization. The former corresponds directly to one of our individual-level risk 
measures.29 The latter is meant to serve as a summary measure of job losses as a result of 
technological change. As argued in Iversen and Cusack (2000), deindustrialization is a 
particularly dramatic, and easily measured, instance of labor market changes that forces some 
workers to find jobs outside the sector for which their skills were originally developed. The 
variable is defined as 100 minus the sum of manufacturing and agricultural employment as a 
percentage of the working age population.30 The raw data constructing these variables are drawn 
from OECD, Labour Force Statistics (various years). 
 
                                                 
28 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
West Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
United States. 
29 The correlation between unemployment and deindustrialization is 0.7.  
30 The base of 100 is arbitrary. For example, one could have used the peak of 
employment in agriculture and manufacturing as the base instead; and this is a number that 
varies across countries. However, since the statistical model includes a full set of country 
dummies the base does not matter.  
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Political-institutional variables: 
The political-institutional variables are government partisanship, the electoral system, and the 
training system, defined as follows: 
 
Partisanship:  
This is Cusack’s measure of the government center of gravity, which is the average of three 
expert surveys of the left-right position of parties, weighted by the share of parties’ seats in 
government (see Cusack and Engelhardt 2002). The variable goes from left to right and is 
standardized to have a range of 1 and a mean of 0. Much of the variance in this variable is cross-
sectional, and as such it may be conceived as capturing a relatively invariant structural advantage 
of the left or right. In that sense it can be treated as an institutional variable, I. But since 
partisanship also varies over time it can also be entered as a “conjunctural” independent variable, 
X. We always include it as a control, but try it out as a conditioning “institutional” variable as 
well.  
 
Electoral systems: 
This is a simple division of electoral systems in into majoritarian (0) and PR (1). The 
categorization is based on Lijphart’s (1994) analysis of democratic institutions. Since this 
variable does not change over time, it is treated as a conditioning institutional variable. 
 
Vocational training systems: 
The training system is measured as the share of an age cohort going through a vocational 
training, assuming that vocational training is a measure of specific skills acquisition. The data is 
taken from UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook (1999). This measure, which starts in 1980s, is in 
principle annual, but it exhibits little meaningful variation over time and is treated here as an 
invariant institutional variable. We simply extrapolated it back in time to cover earlier periods.  
 
Controls: 
Finally, in the estimations with time-dummies are used, we control for the size of dependent 
population, which is the sum of unemployed and people over the age of 64 as a percentage of the 
total population. In the models where the shock variables are unemployment or 
deindustrialization, we control only for the size of the senior population (as a percentage of the 
total population) to avoid entering unemployment, or a close substitute, twice. The source for the 
unemployment and population figures is OECD, Labour Force Statistics (various years). 
 
3.2.2. Findings 
 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the regression equation (2), using non-linear least 
squares.31 The first line is the total time effect, or the total effect of the exogenous shocks. It is 
calculated taking the difference between the parameter on the 1995 time dummy and the 
parameter on the 1960 time dummy after all variables have been defined as deviations from their 
cross-country means. By defining all variables as deviations from their means the effect of the 
time dummies will capture the change over time. What we want to know is whether governments 
in countries with strong vocational training systems, PR electoral systems, or left governments 
react differently to shocks than governments in countries with weak vocational training systems, 
                                                 
31 It is necessary to use non-linear least squares (the nl procedure in Stata) to estimate the 
model because the functional form of the interaction between the time dummies and the 
institutional variable is unknown ex ante. Only non-linear estimation will yield a single 
parameter for each institutional variable, β j, in equation (2). 
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majoritaritarian institutions, or right governments. And, again, the parameter β on the interaction 
terms provides the answer. If it is positive it means that shocks cause spending to increase more 
in countries with high values on the political-institutional variables.  
 
It is possible to get a very intuitive measure of the substantive effect by distinguishing the 
spending effects of shocks in countries with extreme values on the institutional variables. These 
effects are found by adding to and subtracting from the time effect the product between this 
effect and the estimated parameter β times the minimum and maximum values on the 
institutional variables. For example, model (1) in Table 4 shows that the effect on transfers of the 
exogenous shocks that occurred between 1960 and 1995 has been to raise spending as a 
percentage of GDP by 5 percent in a country with the weakest vocational training system, but by 
nearly 12 percent in a country with the strongest vocational training system. These numbers are 
referred to as the “minimum” and the “maximum” at the base of the Table. What is termed the 
“effect” is the difference between the two. This number can be read as a summary measure of the 
impact of an institution on any particular spending variable. In the case of the vocational training 
systems this effect is 6.6 percent, which is about 90 percent of the total time effect (and easily 
significant at a .01 level).  
 
Countries with PR electoral systems (Table 4, model 2) also responded to shocks by 
increasing spending more than countries with majoritarian systems. The effect is about 4 percent 
or roughly half the total time effect. The effect of partisanship (Table 4, model 3) is more 
complicated because right governments actually spend more on transfers than left governments 
when there are no shocks, yet left governments respond to shocks by increasing spending more 
than right governments. If we focus only on the responses to shocks, the effect of having a left 
government is roughly the same as having PR (about 4 percent). One plausible interpretation of 
this pattern is that there are transfers, such as pensions, that are not redistributive and for which 
demand is high among right party constituencies, whereas transfers that respond to labor market 
shocks tend primarily to affect left party constituencies. Recall that the individual level results 
referred to risks and preferences for redistributive spending. The high responsiveness of the left 
to shocks can reasonably be seen as reflecting this combination.  
 
In a model where all three conditioning variables are entered simultaneously (Table 4, 
model 4), vocational training and PR account for roughly the same share of the cross-time 
variation, and about 90 percent together. However, since the two variables are highly correlated 
(0.8), small measurement errors can have a significant impact on how much of the variance is 
attributed to each variable. The estimated effect of the partisan variable is notably reduced in the 
combined model. A reasonable interpretation for this change is that institutions affect both 
partisanship and government responses to shocks. But, again, since all three variables are 
correlated and subject to measurement error, one must be careful in attributing exact weights to 
each variable.  
 
Did governments respond differently to the changing economic environment during the 
1980s and 90s than they did during the 1960s and 70s? The question is difficult to answer with 
precision because government spending did not change very much in the second period, leaving 
very little variance to be explained. In itself this suggests that governments either became more 
constrained or reached some equilibrium level of spending by the early 1980s. Either way, it has 
the implication that small measurement errors, again, can have big effects on the results. With 
that caveat in mind, the period by period results in Table 5 (which omit the controls for 
presentational economy) give no indication that there has been a convergence in government 
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responses. In fact, all the parameters are larger in the second period although, again, since the 
time effect is dramatically smaller in the second period, so is the overall effect. 
 
Table 4: Common shocks, national institutions, and government transfers (equation (2)) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time 
effect (“shock”) 
 
Voc. training* 
time dummies 
 
PR* 
time dummies 
 
Partisanship* 
time dummies 
 
Partisanship 
 
 
Dependency ratiot 
 
7.20*** 
(0.86) 
 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
0.93** 
(0.40) 
 
0.54*** 
(0.07) 
 
7.67*** 
(0.87) 
 
- 
 
 
0.53*** 
(0.08) 
 
- 
 
 
0.81** 
(0.40) 
 
0.58*** 
(0.07) 
 
6.53*** 
(0.90) 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.75*** 
(0.21) 
 
3.91*** 
(0.86) 
 
0.64*** 
(0.08) 
 
7.42*** 
(0.53) 
 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
 
-0.11 
(0.77) 
 
1.23 
(0.77) 
 
0.58*** 
(0.07) 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Effect 
5.17 
 
11.72 
 
6.56 
5.16 
 
9.22 
 
4.07 
4.41 
 
8.32 
 
3.91 
4.59 
 
11.11 
 
6.57 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Number of observations 564 564 564 564 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The results for the interactive terms correspond to β in the statistical model. The results for 
country and time dummies are not shown. 
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Table 5: Shocks and government transfers in two sub-periods 
 
 1960-79 1980-95 
Vocational training 0.015*** 0.054*** 
Time effect 7.44*** 0.84** 
PR 0.364*** 1.51*** 
Time effect 6.76*** 1.44*** 
Partisanship 0.37** 1.27* 
Time effect 6.19** 1.18*** 
 Note: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
So far we have not identified the nature of the shocks. This is a virtue in the sense that the 
results do not depend on any particular conceptualization of the exogenous forces of change. On 
the other hand, knowing what the shocks are, and whether domestic institutions induce different 
responses to different types, is of independent interest. Identifying the shocks also allow the 
possibility that some countries have been more exposed to shocks than others. This is potentially 
important since if the shocks are correlated with the institutions, the shocks rather than the 
institutions could explain the divergence in policies.  
 
We therefore estimate equation (3) using two different sources of shocks: unemployment 
and deindustrialization. These variables both refer to labor shedding and should be related to the 
individual-level risk variables. The results are shown in Table 6. The presentation is similar to 
Table 4, except that the “shock effect” now is the difference between the observed values on 
each “shock” variable at the beginning of the period (1960) and at end of the period (1995) times 
the estimated coefficient on the shock variable. The exception is unemployment, which is the 
difference between the year with the lowest and the year with the highest average unemployment 
rate across the 16 cases. This difference is 6.98 percent and the estimated parameter is .73, so the 
total shock effect of unemployment is 6.98*.73= 5.10. The calculation of the political-
institutional effects then proceeds as before, using the extremes on the institutional and partisan 
variables to determine the minimum and maximum effects. 
 
In the case of unemployment, the combined effect of vocational training, PR, and 
partisanship (calculated as before) is greater than the total shock effect. This is possible because 
the latter is based on the average change in unemployment over time, while some countries 
experienced changes that were greater than the average. Note that vocational training and left 
partisanship notably magnify the response to unemployment, whereas PR appears to be less 
important. Specifically, a country with a strong vocational training system (defined as one that is 
one standard deviation above the mean), responds to a 5 percent increase in unemployment by 
increasing transfers as a percent of GDP by 1.7 more than a country with a weak vocational 
training system. The comparable figure for the difference between left and right governments 
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(also defined in standard deviations) is 1.1, whereas the difference between a PR and a 
majoritarian system is 0.5. The fact that partisanship now records a strong effect makes good 
sense because we know from the micro-level analysis that income and exposure to 
unemployment risks are negatively related. If left parties represent low income workers they 
should be more responsive to unemployment shocks.  
 
 
Table 6: Shocks, national institutions, and government transfers (equation (3)) 
 
 Exogenous source of shock: 
 Unemployment Deindustrialization 
Shock effect 
 
 
Voc. training* 
Shock 
 
PR* 
Shock 
 
Partisanship* 
Shock 
 
Partisanship 
 
 
Population over 64t 
5.10*** 
(0.22) 
 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.119 
(0.109) 
 
-0.489*** 
(0.180) 
 
0.656 
(0.435) 
 
0.826*** 
(0.039) 
 
8.15*** 
(0.43) 
 
0.0012*** 
(0.0005) 
 
0.206*** 
(0.074) 
 
0.128 
(0.128) 
 
-3.629 
(4.471) 
 
0.325*** 
(0.059) 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Effect 
2.22 
 
7.94 
 
5.72 
6.52 
 
9.68 
 
3.17 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.91 0.92 
Number of observations 564 564 
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The results for the interactive terms correspond to β in the statistical model. The 
results for country and time dummies are not shown. 
 
Partisanship, however, does not appear to matter to the extent to which governments 
respond to deindustrialization. The reason may be that deindustrialization affects workers across 
the income scale, and therefore does not sharply differentiate left and right constituencies. This 
interpretation is consistent with the results in Iversen & Cusack (2000) but leaves open the 
possibility that left governments are more ideologically inclined to expand public sector 
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employment, which is not captured by our dependent transfer variable. In fact, if we use 
government spending on goods and services as the response variable, it turns out that left 
governments raise spending significantly more than right governments in response to 
deindustrialization. This is again entirely consistent with Iversen & Cusack (2000). 
 
Viewed in combination, the results in Tables 4 - 6 paint a very clear picture. Exogenous 
economic shocks lead to greater government spending, but the effects are conditioned by 
government partisanship and domestic institutions in a very clear and predictable pattern. If one 
looks at the summary measures of the effects at the bottom of Tables 4 and 6, governments 
(especially left ones) seem to respond much more forcefully to exogenous shocks in countries 
with proportional representation and strong vocational training systems. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
It is increasingly popular to argue that the politics of redistribution is about non-economic 
matters such as religion or ethnicity. It is also a widespread view that people are uninformed 
about their economic interests or that globalization and other forces of change have caused 
convergence in government policies. We find little support for any of these views in the 
comprehensive analyses at the micro- and macro-level detailed in this paper. Instead we find a 
clear structure to popular preferences, party competition, and government policies that is firmly 
rooted in economic self interest and stable institutional differences. The poor favor redistribution 
and individuals respond to the risks of losing future employment or income – measured by 
occupational unemployment rates and specific skills – with increased demands for redistribution 
and support for the left. In so far as they affect the level of risk exposure, differences in 
institutions lead to different intensities of redistribution demands across countries. Vocational 
training systems (and the variation in economies’ skill compositions they produce) are such 
institutions. 
 
Institutions not only mold aggregate demand for redistribution, they also shape the supply 
of redistribution. Electoral systems affect governments’ responses to economic shocks if the 
main axis of political competition is redistribution and if income and risk exposure are related. 
This is so because PR systems tend to produce left-center coalitions – representing the poor and 
middle class – while majoritarian systems tend to produce center-right governments – 
representing the rich and middle class. The paper shows that income and risk exposure are 
strongly negatively related, which leads left governments to react more aggressively than right 
governments to economic shocks. 
 
Our findings have several implications. To begin with, the paper clearly shows that 
objective economic conditions play an important and predictable role in shaping redistribution 
preferences. While this is often assumed by some scholars and denied by others, we shed light on 
this – ultimately empirical – question. Secondly, all the evidence suggests that adverse economic 
shocks increase the level of government protection. Insofar as globalization is a source of such 
shocks, it raises the demand for redistribution and thus shores up support for the welfare state. 
On the supply side, the paper’s findings also imply that the globalization literature makes claims 
that are not supported by the data: there is no evidence of convergence; there is no evidence for 
the end of old (redistribution) politics; and there is no evidence for decreased differences 
between governments of different colors.  
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We also think our analysis shows the advantage of combining the micro and macro levels 
in explaining how governments react to economic shocks. Yet we were not able to examine 
every assumption about the interaction between the two levels. For example, this paper 
operationalizes risk exposure at the individual level and economic shocks at the country level. 
But we have not gone very far in terms of identifying the nature of the shocks and how they 
affect individual level risks. Exposure to competition from low wage countries, technological 
change, deindustrialization, and so on, affect different groups differently, and that in turn shapes 
the politics of compensation. Some changes spread risks broadly while others concentrate them. 
In addition, we have only considered the effects of a small number of institutions. In particular, it 
may prove fruitful to investigate whether institutions that are often argued to inhibit change, such 
as federalism and bicameralism, affect the speed with which governments respond to shocks. A 
more refined institutional model may also have implications for the structure of individual-level 
cleavages over policies. 
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6. Appendices 
6.1. Variable descriptions 
 
Table A1: Variable description 
 
Variable Values Description 
Preference 
variable I 
1 definitely 
should be 
2 probably 
should be 
3 probably 
should not be 
4 definitely 
should not be 
Survey question: 
“On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the 
government’s responsibility to: Reduce income differences 
between the rich and poor?” 
Preference 
variable II 
1 agree 
strongly 
2 agree 
3 neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
4 disagree 
5 disagree 
strongly 
Survey question: 
“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes.” 
Job 
(In)security 
As preference 
variable II 
Survey question: 
“[…] show how much you agree or disagree that [the statement] 
applies to your [main] job. My job is secure.”  
Partisan 
Affiliation 
1 far right 
2 right 
3 centrist 
4 left 
5 far left 
6 other 
This variables codes an individual’s partisan affiliation, defined 
in a broad way (affiliation, vote in last election, vote intention 
in next election). 
See Table A5 below. 
Spending for 
Health 
As preference 
variable II 
Survey question: 
“Please show whether you would like to see more or less 
government spending in each area. Remember that if you say 
“much more”, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.” 
Here: “More or less government spending for health.” 
Spending for 
pensions 
As preference 
variable II 
As above, but here: “More or less government spending for old 
age pensions.” 
Spending for 
unemployment 
benefits 
As preference 
variable II 
As above, but here: “More or less government spending for 
unemployment benefits.” 
-- continued on next page --
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Table A1: Variable description (continued) 
 
Variable Values Description 
Income 1 (lowest) – 
9 (highest) 
This variable measure household income in 9 quantiles. The 
quantiles were calculated by country-year on censored data (right-
censored at 95th percentile). 
Age 18-97 Age in years 
Gender 0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for female, 0 otherwise 
Student 0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for student, 0 otherwise 
Retired 0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for retired, 0 otherwise 
Unemployed 0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for unemployed, 0 otherwise 
Non-
Employed 
0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for not employed (“housewife / -man, 
permanently disabled / sick, not in labor force / not working”), 0 
otherwise 
Self 
Employment 
0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for self employed, 0 otherwise 
Public 
Employment 
0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for being in public employment, 0 otherwise 
Union 
Member 
0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for union membership, 0 otherwise 
Church 
attendance 
0-5 Frequency of church attendance. 0 = no (Christian) religion; 1 = 
never; 2 = less frequently [than several times a year]; 3 = several 
times a year; 4 = once to three times a month; 5 = once a week. 
Protestant 0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for being catholic, 0 otherwise 
Catholic 0 or 1 Dummy equals 1 for being protestant, 0 otherwise 
Minority 0 or 1 Dummy variables for various ethnic or linguistic groups. Contact 
authors for details. 
Country 
dummies 
0 or 1 Dummy variables for each country. 
Year 
dummies 
0 or 1 Dummy variables for each year of field-work. 
-- continued on next page --
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Table A1: Variable description (continued) 
 
Variable Values Description 
Merged data:   
Skill Specificity 0 (low) to ca. 3.33 
(right censored) 
This variable measures an individual’s skill 
specificity. Like in Iversen & Soskice (2001), 
it is calculated as: [(Share of ISCO-88 level 4 
groups)/ 
(share of labor force)] divided by ISCO level 
of skills (s1) or highest level of education (s2), 
respectively. The employed measure is an 
average of s1 and s2. We take the “share of 
labor force” from labor force surveys, as a 
grand mean over all country-years we have in 
the sample. The variable is right-censored 
approximately at its 95th percentile. Individuals 
not employed have a 0 on this variable. 
Occupational 
unemployment rates 
0 to 20 (right 
censored) 
This variable measures occupational 
unemployment rates at the most detailed level 
available. More concretely, we use the 
following data: 
• USA: 1985-2001 at ISCO88-2d (gendered) 
• Canada: 1987-2001 at ISCO88-1d (gendered) 
• UK: 1985-1990 at OPCS1980, 16 groups 
(gendered); 1990-91 at ISCO88-2d (gendered); 
1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Ireland: 1987-1991 at ISCO88-1d (gendered), 1992-
2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Netherlands: missing 
• France: missing 
• Switzerland: 1991-95 at ISCO88-1d (gendered), 
1996-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Spain: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Portugal: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Germany: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Austria: 1995-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Finland: 1997-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Sweden: 1998-99 at ISCO88-1d (gendered), 2000-
01 at ISCO88-2d 
• Norway: 1996-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Denmark: 1992-2001 at ISCO88-2d 
• Australia: 1997-2001 at ISCO88-1d (gendered) 
• New Zealand: 1991-2001 at ISCO88-1d (gendered) 
 
Individuals not employed have a 0 on this 
variable. 
 
Sources: National labor force surveys (USA, 
UK), EU labor force surveys, ILO 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistic of Key Variables 
 
 Redistributional Preference 
Partisan 
Affiliation 
Perceived Job 
Insecurity 
Occupational 
Unemployment Rates 
Skill Specificity 
(mean / median) 
Range 1-5 1-4 1-5 1-5 ]0;20] ]0;3.33] 
 contra to pro right to left low to high low to high low to high 
USA 2.84 2.37 3.07 2.17 3.36 1.37 / 1.13 
Canada 3.11 2.47 3.16 2.49 4.73 1.18 / 1.11 
United 
Kingdom 3.57 3.07 3.01 2.51 3.03 1.59 / 1.26 
Ireland 3.73 3.27 3.23 2.31 4.94 1.51 / 1.38 
Switzerland 3.36 2.88 3.10 2.44 2.00 1.38 / 1.34 
Spain 3.92 3.38 3.26 2.51 5.60 1.62 / 1.66 
Portugal 4.36 3.66 3.58 2.41 2.84 1.84 / 1.94 
West 
Germany 3.41 2.88 3.38 2.18 3.69 1.68 / 1.80 
East 
Germany 4.05 3.39 3.69 3.04 3.50 1.69 / 1.86 
Austria 3.72 3.06 3.33 - 1.58 1.55 / 1.38 
Finland 3.99 - 3.47 - 4.63 1.50 / 1.38 
Sweden 3.67 3.11 3.43 - 4.03 1.49 / 1.23 
Norway 3.57 3.20 2.93 2.23 2.13 1.37 / 1.18 
Denmark 3.33 2.36 3.11 1.84 3.08 1.45 / 1.26 
Australia 3.26 2.88 2.96  2.92 1.37 / 1.22 
New 
Zealand 3.12 2.60 2.98 2.54 4.23 1.34 / 1.23 
Note: 
Last two columns refer to observations with reported occupational information only. 
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Figure A1: Redistributional Preferences (5 answer categories) 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
disagree strongly disagree neither agree
nor disagree
agree agree strongly
"It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes"
N
um
be
r o
f r
es
po
nd
en
ts
 
 
Figure A2: Redistributional Preferences (4 answer categories) 
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6.2. Country-years included in the micro-analyses 
 
Table A3: Country-years included in the micro-level analyses 
Country-years in models 1 (Table 1 and Table A6) 
 1985 1987 1990 1992 1993 1996 1999 2000 
USA X X X X X X X+ X 
Canada    X X X X X+ 
United Kingdom    X X X X X 
Ireland     X X  X+ 
Switzerland      X++  X 
Spain     X+ X X X 
Portugal       X X 
West Germany    X X X X+ X 
East Germany    X X X X+ X 
Austria       X+ X+ 
Finland        X 
Sweden       X X+ 
Norway      X X X 
Denmark        X+ 
Australia       X  
New Zealand    X X X+ X X+ 
Notes: 
Columns refer to year of ISSP survey. In some country-years, survey was fielded one or even two years later 
(indicated by + and ++, respectively). 
A bold X indicates that country-year drops from model 2 due to missing values. 
 
Table A4: Country-years included in the micro-level analyses 
Country-years in model 4 (Table 1 and Table A6) 
 1985 1990 1991 1996 1998 
USA X X X X X 
Canada    X  
United Kingdom   X X  
Ireland   X X X 
Switzerland    X++ X+ 
Spain    X X 
Portugal     X+ 
West Germany    X X 
East Germany    X X 
Austria     X+ 
Sweden     X 
Norway    X X 
Denmark     X 
Australia     X 
New Zealand   X X+ X 
Notes: 
Columns refer to year of ISSP survey. In some country-years, survey was fielded one or even two years later 
(indicated by + and ++, respectively). 
A bold X indicates that country-year drops from model 4 due to missing values. 
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6.4. Additional results 
 
Table A6: Determinants of Preferences for Redistribution (4 answer categories) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pro Redistribution (4 answer categories) 
   Occupational unemployment rate a 0.025*** [0.004] 
0.027*** 
[0.004] 
0.047*** 
[0.008] 
0.028*** 
[0.004] 
   Skill specificity b 0.130*** [0.025] 
0.134*** 
[0.025] 
0.044 
[0.040] 
0.140*** 
[0.028] 
   Unemployed 0.629*** [0.074] 
0.629*** 
[0.078] 
0.625*** 
[0.111] 
0.776*** 
[0.083] 
   Income c -0.152*** [0.006] 
-0.156*** 
[0.006] 
-0.149*** 
[0.009] 
-0.151*** 
[0.006] 
   Age 0.002 [0.001] 
0.002** 
[0.001] 
0.001 
[0.002] 
0.003** 
[0.001] 
   Gender (female) 0.221*** [0.027] 
0.227*** 
[0.028] 
0.239*** 
[0.042] 
0.220*** 
[0.030] 
   Non-employed 0.353*** [0.055] 
0.358*** 
[0.056] 
0.356*** 
[0.084] 
0.509*** 
[0.065] 
   Student 0.201*** [0.074] 
0.191** 
[0.077] 
0.211* 
[0.120] 
0.381*** 
[0.085] 
   Retired 0.295*** [0.063] 
0.285*** 
[0.065] 
0.352*** 
[0.098] 
0.442*** 
[0.072] 
   Self-employed -0.468*** [0.043] 
-0.519*** 
[0.046] 
-0.522*** 
[0.071] 
-0.316*** 
[0.049] 
   Church attendance d  -0.009 [0.010]   
   Protestant  -0.086** [0.037]   
   Catholic  0.074* [0.043]   
   Minority   0.583*** [0.079]  
   Publicly employed    0.258*** [0.037] 
   Union membership    0.254*** [0.039] 
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 27793 25773 10823 23615 
Pseudo 2R  0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -33540.8 -31264.5 -13434.3 -27850.5 
Wald 2χ  (degrees of freedom) 4956.6 (30) 4542.68 (33) 1906.22 (19) 3662.22 (30) 
Notes: 
Ordered logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights). 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
See appendix for details on variable descriptions. 
a Right censored at 20% (ca. 95th percentile), at the most detailed occupational level. Zeros for people not in labor force. 
b Right censored at 3.33 (ca. 95th percentile). Zeros for people not in labor force. 
c In 9 (national) quantiles. 
d Church attendance [0 (no (Christian) religion, 1 (never), …, 5 (once a week)]. Results do not change if zeros (0) are changed to 
missing values. 
Results for models (2) & (3) including the control variables ‘publicly employed’ and ‘union membership’ are basically the same. 
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The following two tables display more results on the church attendance argument put 
forward by Scheve & Stasavage (2005). Table A7 reports models with the religious variables, 
including and excluding our risk exposure measures. Table A8 uses one basic specification for 
different dependent variables capturing redistributional preferences. These dependent variables 
were suggested in Iversen & Soskice (2001) and are also employed in Scheve & Stasavage 
(2005). Amongst these is a variable summarizing three different survey questions into factor 
scores. These questions ask about preferences for government spending on unemployment 
benefits, health, and old age pension. They tap the insurance aspect of redistribution even better 
than the redistributional questions employed in this paper. We report the specifications estimated 
throughout this paper below, but amended by the religious variables. Table A8 reports the results 
for each of these variables separately as well as for the factor scores. The factor scores are based 
on a principal component analysis of the three items. The results excluding the religious 
variables are not reported because the pattern is the same as in Table A7. While church 
attendance is most of the time a statistically significant determinant for preferences over 
redistribution as insurance, its estimated coefficient always drops in size and significance once 
risk exposure variables are added to the equation. More often than not, this drop is so sharp that 
it is difficult to argue that religious variables are important determinants of preferences over 
redistribution, whether it comes in the form of income redistribution or insurance. 
 
 Coupled with the mixed results on ethnicity and the positive results on income and risk 
exposure, it is safe to conclude that redistributional preferences are rationally formed and that 
redistribution is a major ingredient of politics. 
50
  
 
Table A7: Determinants of Preferences for Redistribution (with Religion) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pro Redistribution (5 answer categories) 
Pro Redistribution 
(4 answer categories) 
RELIGION:     
   Church attendance d -0.028*** [0.006] 
-0.021*** 
[0.008] 
-0.025*** 
[0.008] 
-0.009 
[0.010] 
   Protestant -0.118*** [0.021] 
-0.135*** 
[0.028] 
-0.127*** 
[0.026] 
-0.086** 
[0.037] 
   Catholic 0.071*** [0.025] 
0.092*** 
[0.033] 
0.027 
[0.031] 
0.074* 
[0.043] 
RISKS:     
   Occupational unemployment rate a - 0.021*** [0.004] - 
0.027*** 
[0.004] 
   Skill specificity b - 0.134*** [0.019] - 
0.134*** 
[0.025] 
REALIZED RISK:     
   Unemployed 0.188*** [0.039] 
0.577*** 
[0.058] 
0.261*** 
[0.050] 
0.629*** 
[0.078] 
CONTROLS:     
   Income c -0.156*** [0.003] 
-0.147*** 
[0.004] 
-0.168*** 
[0.004] 
-0.156*** 
[0.006] 
   Age 0.001* [0.001] 
0.001 
[0.001] 
0.003*** 
[0.001] 
0.002** 
[0.001] 
   Gender (female) 0.133*** [0.015] 
0.176*** 
[0.021] 
0.186*** 
[0.020] 
0.227*** 
[0.028] 
   Non-employed -0.011 [0.023] 
0.299*** 
[0.044] 
0.008 
[0.030] 
0.358*** 
[0.056] 
   Student -0.123*** [0.039] 
0.249*** 
[0.059] 
-0.237*** 
[0.049] 
0.191** 
[0.077] 
   Retired -0.077*** [0.029] 
0.285*** 
[0.050] 
-0.077** 
[0.036] 
0.285*** 
[0.065] 
   Self-employed -0.390*** [0.027] 
-0.359*** 
[0.036] 
-0.538*** 
[0.034] 
-0.519*** 
[0.046] 
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Observations 78500 44576 49320 25773 
Pseudo 2R  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -111737.71 -62882.72 -59467.06 -31264.54 
Wald 2χ  (degrees of freedom) 9993.91 (41) 6997.58 (39) 7112.89 (35) 4542.68 (33) 
Notes: 
Ordered logit regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights). 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a, b, c See Table 1. See appendix for details on variable descriptions. 
d Church attendance [0 (no (Christian) religion, 1 (never), …, 5 (once a week)]. Results do not change if zeros (0) are changed to 
missing values. 
Results including the control variables ‘publicly employed’ and ‘union membership’ (see Table 1, models 2 & 4) are basically the 
same. 
Based on ISSP data for USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands (not in models 2 & 4), France (not in models 2 & 4), 
Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, West Germany, East Germany, Austria, Finland (not in models 3 & 4), Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Australia, New Zealand, for various survey years.  
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Figure A3: Changes in redistributive preferences as a function 
of church attendance (not controlling for risk exposure) 
0.00
0.01 0.01
0.00
-0.02
0.00
0.01 0.01
0.00
-0.03
-0.05
0.00
0.05
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Note: Change in church attendance from min (0) to max (5) and p20 to p80. Simulations based on model (1) in Table A5. 
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Table A8: Determinants of Preferences for Government Spending (with Religion) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pro government spending for 
 Health Pension Unemployment Benefits 
Factor Scores 
on (1) to (3) e 
Range of dependent variable 1 to 5 1 to 5 1 to 5 -2.9 to 1.65 
Estimation Logit Logit Logit OLS 
RELIGION:     
   Church attendance d -0.073*** [0.018] 
-0.086*** 
[0.019] 
-0.037* 
[0.019] 
-0.034*** 
[0.007] 
   Protestant 0.019 [0.060] 
0.136** 
[0.062] 
-0.131** 
[0.062] 
0.015 
[0.022] 
   Catholic 0.126* [0.072] 
0.317*** 
[0.072] 
0.017 
[0.071] 
0.083*** 
[0.025] 
RISKS:     
   Occupational unemployment rate a 0.015* [0.008] 
0.017** 
[0.008] 
0.031*** 
[0.009] 
0.009*** 
[0.003] 
   Skill specificity b 0.115*** [0.043] 
0.180*** 
[0.046] 
0.117** 
[0.048] 
0.067*** 
[0.017] 
REALIZED RISK:     
   Unemployed 0.531*** [0.130] 
0.513*** 
[0.131] 
1.367*** 
[0.134] 
0.367*** 
[0.048] 
CONTROLS:     
   Income c -0.095*** [0.009] 
-0.132*** 
[0.010] 
-0.138*** 
[0.010] 
-0.056*** 
[0.004] 
   Age 0.002 [0.002] 
0.009*** 
[0.002] 
0.005** 
[0.002] 
0.003*** 
[0.001] 
   Gender (female) 0.423*** [0.047] 
0.219*** 
[0.047] 
0.229*** 
[0.047] 
0.131*** 
[0.017] 
   Non-employed 0.339*** [0.096] 
0.389*** 
[0.099] 
0.431*** 
[0.099] 
0.176*** 
[0.035] 
   Student -0.004 [0.141] 
0.157 
[0.163] 
0.403*** 
[0.154] 
0.100* 
[0.060] 
   Retired 0.301*** [0.109] 
0.303*** 
[0.116] 
0.277** 
[0.113] 
0.150*** 
[0.041] 
   Self-employed -0.133* [0.077] 
-0.371*** 
[0.087] 
-0.473*** 
[0.080] 
-0.148*** 
[0.029] 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9369 9294 9276 9070 
(Pseudo) 2R  0.08 0.08 0.09 0.23 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -10470.1 -10187.7 -11307.2  
Wald 2χ  (degrees of freedom) 1696.43 (21) 1160.4 (21) 1554.91 (21)  
Notes: 
Ordered logit and OLS regressions, using weights (design weights * sample weights). 
(Robust) standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a, b, c See Table 1. See appendix for details on variable descriptions. 
d See Table A7. 
e Factor scores from principal factor analysis. Factor loadings are 0.63 (health), 0.64 (unemployment benefits); 0.71 (pension) 
Based on ISSP 1996 for USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Switzerland, West Germany, East Germany, Norway, New 
Zealand.  
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